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Abstract: The paper discussed the economic theory of international antitrust insti-
tutions. Economic theory shows that non-coordinated competition policies of re-
gimes that are territorially smaller than the international markets on which business 
companies compete violate cross-border allocative efficiency and are deficient with 
respect to global welfare. At the same time, some diversity of antitrust institutions 
and policies promotes dynamic and evolutionary efficiency so that globally binding, 
worldwide homogenous competition rules do not represent a first-best solution 
either. After reviewing the existing international antitrust institutions and their pro-
spects and limits from an economic perspective (with a focus on the International 
Competition Network, ICN), the paper discusses reform proposals from economic 
literature. 
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1. Introduction 
The fundamental problem addressed in this chapter is simple in its structure: busi-
ness companies compete increasingly on international or even worldwide markets 
whereas the regulation and governance of this business behavior remain bound to 
territorially-defined jurisdiction. In other words, the geographical area of competi-
tion often exceeds the geographical scope of competition rules and policy. In even 
other words, while competition among enterprises is globalizing, competition poli-
cy remains national1. This basic problem entails three more specific research ques-
tions: (i) Do we need international antitrust institutions in correspondence to inter-
nationalizing competition among enterprises? And if the answer is in the affirma-
tive, then (ii) what is the design of effective and efficient international antitrust in-
stitutions? Eventually if we know about (ii), then (iii) how can effective and efficient 
international antitrust institutions be implemented?  
This chapter deals with question (i) in its second section and addresses question (ii) 
and partly (iii) in its third and fourth section along with presenting the state of de-
velopment of actual international antitrust institutions. Furthermore, section four 
brings together the two preceding sections by contrasting the current state of in-
ternational competition policy with the needs of effective and efficient internation-
al antitrust institutions that are developed in the second section. In doing so, it de-
rives an agenda of open problems that put up a challenge for the existing interna-
tional antitrust institutions regarding their future development. Moreover, it dis-
cusses a proposal from the economic literature that may serve to solve these open 
problems. Section five concludes. 
Analyzing international antitrust institutions represents a multi-disciplinary task, 
comprising economics, legal sciences and political sciences. Accordingly, contribu-
tors to this research come from all three disciplines, working with very differing 
methods and theories. Written by an economist, this chapter naturally takes an 
economic perspective, however, arguments, reasoning and references from the 
other two disciplines are included and – hopefully – appropriately valued. Some of 
the central vocabulary in this chapter may receive different definitions and usage in 
different disciplinary contexts. Therefore, let me make explicitly clear that antitrust 
and competition are used interchangeably regarding rules, policies, economics or 
regimes. Furthermore, the term institution is used in an economics understanding, 
implying that institutions are understood to be an interrelated set of rules and can 
be distinguished from organizations: while organizations belong to the ‘players of 

1  Strictly speaking, this is incorrect since the European Competition Policy System represents an 
effective supranational competition policy regime. However, as other competition policy systems 
of big territories (like the U.S. one), it remains bound to a territorial jurisdiction that in many cas-
es is geographically smaller than the extent of the markets in which companies compete. There-
fore, and even though it is legally and politically incorrect, I will treat European competition poli-
cy as a ‘national’ one throughout this chapter.
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the game’, institutions represent the ‘rules of the game’ (North 1990; Vanberg 
1994).  
2. The Economics of International Antitrust 
The economics of competition represent a vital, comprehensive and also diversified 
research area encompassing several ‘schools’ of thought and widespread conflict-
ing opinions about various details of pro- and anticompetitive arrangements and 
business strategies. However, even in the absence of any unifying economic theory 
of competition2, the vast majority of competition economics schools, scholars and 
researchers agree on the necessity of having competition rules (prohibiting anti-
competitive arrangements and business strategies3) and an effective enforcement 
of these rules (competition policy combating anticompetitive arrangements and 
business strategies). Joining this mainstream position, naturally, represents a pre-
condition for engaging in an economic analysis of the pros and cons of interna-
tional antitrust institutions. However, accepting and advocating the existence of 
competition rules and policy on a national level of jurisdiction does not automati-
cally imply advocating international antitrust institutions. The question whether 
national competition regimes can effectively and efficiently govern cross-border 
anticompetitive arrangements and business strategies is not a trivial one and, con-
sequently, has attracted the attention of economic research. As a result, the prob-
lems of (i) cross-border externalities of national competition policies, (ii) deficiencies 
of multiple procedures, (iii) loopholes in the protection of competition, and (iv) the 
diversity of competition philosophies and regimes around the world are discussed. 
2.1.  International Externalities of National Competition Policies 
If companies compete on relevant markets that are geographically larger than the 
jurisdiction of competition policy regimes, incongruence between governance and 
governed actors occurs which is likely to produce cross-border externalities. If the 

2  For the fundamental improbability of any unifying competition theory see Budzinski (2008b) who 
also presents an updated overview on the most popular schools of economic thought about 
competition and their main differences. 
3  Much more than the question whether competition rules and policies are necessary at all, the 
different economic theories of and approaches to competition disagree on the exact borderline 
between procompetitive and anticompetitive arrangements and conduct. However and notwith-
standing, anticompetitive arrangements and conduct usually encompass anticompetitive inter-
business cooperation (cartels), anticompetitive market concentration through mergers and acqui-
sitions as well as business strategies abusing market power with predatory, squeezing, deter-
rence, handicap or foreclosure effects (unilateral anticompetitive strategies). Accordingly, anti-
cartel policy, merger control and abuse control are the three typical categories of competition 
policy. The term anticompetitive arrangements and conduct will be used in this article to encom-
pass these three types of anticompetitive business phenomena. Furthermore, and sometimes 
somewhat neglected in economics, competition rules to combat grossly unfair behavior (espio-
nage, sabotage, false and misleading advertising, consumer protection, etc.) exist in most juris-
dictions.  


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relevant market – delineated according to the state-of-the-art methods in antitrust 
economics – includes several competition policy regimes, then each regime will deal 
with cases that (i) may be caused within and/or outside the jurisdiction and (ii) may 
display anticompetitive effects within and/or outside the jurisdiction. While the first 
issue points at the problem of extraterritorial enforcement power (see section 3.1), 
the effects of the second issue are closely related to the goals of the competition 
policy regimes in question. The typical and predominant situation is that each re-
gime pursues inbound-focused policy goals, like the protection of competition in 
domestic markets or the ‘national’ (consumer) welfare. As a consequence, each ju-
risdiction focuses only on domestic effects, ignoring possible effects abroad. 
Given inbound-focused welfare goals, Barros & Cabral (1994) as well as Head & 
Ries (1997) demonstrate that already an asymmetric allocation of producers and 
consumers among the jurisdictions of the relevant international market suffices to 
cause negative externalities: the uncoordinated, rational decisions of the affected 
regimes are divergent and incompatible with each other. Due to the inbound focus 
of the decisions, negative effects on competition and/or welfare abroad are not 
taken into consideration. Even without any anticompetitive intentions on the side 
of the involved competition authorities, these negative externalities imply a reduc-
tion of welfare compared to a rational decision by a(n international) regime that 
fully encloses the geographical market in question (see also: Sykes 1999; Kaiser & 
Vosgerau 2000; Tay & Willmann 2005; Haucap et al. 2006; Mehra 2008, 2011). 
Competition policy goals focusing on domestic welfare goals, furthermore, offer 
scope for strategic competition policies (Fox 2000; Guzman 2004; Budzinski 2008a: 
53-64; Motta & Ruta 2011), which represent a variation to strategic trade policy 
and, thus, an element of so-called beggar-my-neighbor policies. The underlying 
idea is to increase domestic welfare by redirecting rents of foreigners into the juris-
diction, so that domestic welfare is increased at the expense of foreign welfare. 
Competition policy can be used in order to create so-called ‘national champions’, 
i.e. domestic companies with market power on international markets. Those com-
panies enjoy the ability to exploit consumers in other countries with the profits 
ending up ‘at home’. Instruments of a strategic competition policy may include a 
more permissive merger control towards domestic mergers than towards mergers 
between foreign companies, selective non-enforcement of anti-cartel rules towards 
home companies, antitrust exceptions for domestic key industries or the allowance 
of pure export cartels (creating damages only abroad but securing 
supracompetitive profits for domestic companies). Strategic competition policies 
actively distort competition on international markets, thus, intentionally producing 
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negative externalities, reducing world welfare at the attempted benefit of single 
jurisdictions4. 
Not only but particularly in the case of strategic competition policies (see the eco-
nomic modeling of Motta & Ruta 2012), jurisdictional conflicts may result from di-
verging and mutually incompatible decisions of several national competition au-
thorities on the same antitrust case in an international market. Famous examples 
include the European challenges of the U.S. mergers Boeing-McDonnell Douglas 
(Fox 1998; Kovacic 2001) and GE-Honeywell (Reynolds & Ordover 2002; Gerber 
2003). In both cases, negative externalities on trade relations and diplomatic rela-
tions between the two jurisdictions followed or were on the brink of happening. 
Furthermore, these two famous cases only represent the tip of the iceberg: Klodt 
(2005: 45-65) and Budzinski (2008a: 40-49) list an impressive number of jurisdic-
tional conflicts on competition policy issues, involving a multitude of different 
countries (more recently also China and Russia). 
2.2.  Deficiencies of Multiple Procedures 
Having markets with a geographical scope encompassing multiple non-coordinated 
competition policy regimes inevitably leads to multiple procedures. International 
mergers as well as companies with global strategies (à la Microsoft) often face 
competition policy procedures from (sometimes by far) more than twenty jurisdic-
tions. Next to conflicting outcomes  these multiple procedures exert costs on busi-
ness companies (transaction costs) and taxpayers (administrative costs). Being sub-
ject to x competition policy procedures implies the necessity to submit large-scale 
information in x different languages, acquire knowledge about x different legal sys-
tems, pay notification and other fees to x authorities, pay x times for legal assis-
tance and so on and so forth (overview: ICN 2002). These transaction costs easily 
amount to significant sums of millions of US$, making cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, cooperation agreements and alliances as well as unilateral strategies 
considerably more expensive – including the eventually procompetitive ones. To 
some extent, this discourages beneficial strategies, arrangements and combinations 
of assets and, thus, harms global welfare (Evenett 2002; De Loecker et al. 2008).  
Moreover, a system of non-coordinated domestic competition policies puts a con-
siderable burden on taxpayers. In the end, it is vastly the same facts that all these 
competition authorities are trying to investigate in an international case involving 
multiple procedures. Most of the doubling, tripling and multiplying of investigation 
costs merely increases the ‘production costs’ of competition policy without yielding 
additional ‘output’, insights or benefits. 

4  From an economic point of view, most real-world strategic competition policies are unlikely to 
achieve their goal (increase of domestic welfare). The rent-shifting reasoning often serves to con-
ceal political-economic motives based upon vested interests and lobbyism influence on imperfect 
political decision processes (Kerber & Budzinski 2003, 2004). 


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2.3.  Loopholes in the Protection of Competition 
A system of non-coordinated national competition policies with inbound-focused 
policy goals cannot provide any global welfare-optimal worldwide protection of 
competition if not all jurisdiction dispose over an effective competition policy re-
gime. Although the number of countries without any competition regime has sig-
nificantly decreased during the last two decades, this does not necessarily imply 
that all the new regimes are also effective. As a consequence, loopholes arise and 
they appear to be especially relevant where companies from jurisdictions with 
strong (but inbound-focused) competition regimes (often comparatively wealthy 
industrialized countries) restrict competition in jurisdictions with weak or without 
competition regimes (often comparatively poorer developing countries).5 
2.4.  Diversity of Competition Regimes 
The existing competition regimes in the world differ, inter alia, regarding two di-
mensions. Firstly, the goals of competition policy diverge in focusing on different 
welfare standards (consumer welfare vs. total welfare; allocative welfare vs. dynam-
ic welfare; etc.), on different intermediate goals (different efficiency concepts, pro-
tection of the competitive process, liberty of competition, structure-conduct-
performance concepts, etc.) and on the inclusion of ‘non-welfare’ goals (market 
integration, economic development, fairness, high employment, international com-
petitiveness, etc.). Apart from the fact that the academic controversy about the 
‘right’ goal is not solved at all (inter alia, Fox 2003b; Foer 2005; Farrell & Katz 2006; 
Haucap et al. 2006; Heyer 2006; Kerber 2009; Vanberg 2011; Werden 2011), dem-
ocratic societies may want to substitute some welfare in favor of other values, like 
fairness. As long as the principal explicitly takes the welfare trade off into consider-
ation, this choice is legitimate, although economists may remain skeptical towards 
the underlying value arguments. As a consequence, even in a world without politi-
cal imperfections and deficiencies, national competition regimes cannot be ex-
pected to produce mutually homogenous goals. And if ‘one size does not fit all’ 
(Evans 2009; Gal 2009; Fox 2012), then a diversity of competition regimes is bene-
ficial in the sense of being conformal with the people’s preferences. Secondly, the 
absence of a unifying theory of competition (Budzinski 2008b) implies that differ-
ent regimes will legitimately base their theories of competitive harm on diverging 
economic approaches. Consequently, the dividing line between procompetitive and 
anticompetitive arrangements and conduct will not be the same in each jurisdic-
tion. Similarly, they will use different investigational and analytical methods.  
The resulting competition among competition regimes has been subject to several 
economic analyses (Easterbrook 1983; Hauser & Schoene 1994; Smets & Van 
Cayseele 1995; Sinn 1999; Fox 2000; Guzman 2001; Kerber & Budzinski 2003, 

5  Jenny (2003a, 2003b) as well as Levenstein & Suslow (2004) offer an impressive set of examples. 
8

2004; Stephan 2004). While one should keep in mind that institutional competition 
is a difficult concept that next to similarities also bears important differences to 
goods market competition (Sinn 1990; Tirole 1994), there is an area where compe-
tition among competition regimes yields benefits. If many competition regime ex-
periment with different theories and methods (or even with differing goals), then 
this offers scope for dynamic institutional learning (dynamic and evolutionary effi-
ciency). In case of diversity, competition regimes learn from their own successes 
and failures and, additionally, they learn from other regimes’ successes and failures. 
This mutual learning speeds up the learning process and offers potential to dynam-
ically improve competition policy (Kerber & Budzinski 2003, 2004). Mutual learning 
through decentralized experimentation is particularly fruitful if there is no safe aca-
demic consensus on the ‘right’ solution – like it is the case with competition eco-
nomics (Budzinski 2008b). However, the benefits of a system with decentralized 
elements do not imply that any type of coordination is necessarily eroding these 
learning effects. 
2.5.  Summary 
In summary, the economic analysis of international antitrust demonstrates that a 
system of non-coordinated national competition policies with inbound-focused pol-
icy goals will not be optimal in terms of global welfare. Thus, there is scope for 
beneficial international antitrust institutions. At the same time, the economic anal-
ysis highlights that in the absence of perfect competition economic knowledge de-
centralized elements do possess merits. Altogether, the issues (i) cross-border ex-
ternalities of national competition policies, (ii) deficiencies of multiple procedures, 
(iii) loopholes in the protection of competition, and (iv) learning potential from the 
diversity of competition philosophies and regimes represent criteria against which 
types of international antitrust institutions can be assessed. While (i) – (iii) are moti-
vated by stationary efficiency considerations, (iv) focuses on dynamic and evolu-
tionary efficiency considerations. 
3. Strategies towards International Antitrust Institutions 
3.1.  The Unilateral Strategy: Extraterritorial Enforcement through the 
Effects Doctrine 
This scenario stays very close to the system of non-coordinated and territorially-
bound competition policies that was underlying the economic analysis in section 2. 
However, the effects doctrine6 represents an extraterritorial enlargement of domes-
tic competition policy competences by offering a possibility for countries to unilat-

6  The Effects Doctrine was first applied by the U.S. in the so-called Alcoa-Case in 1945 and has 
subsequently been implemented by most other countries. See also on the following and with 
comprehensive references Budzinski (2008a: 33-49, 168-173).  


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erally react to anticompetitive arrangements and conduct caused abroad (inward 
competition restraints). According to this doctrine, a competition regime claims 
jurisdiction over any business arrangement or conduct that affects its domestic 
markets, irrespective of the location or the nationality of its participants (Griffin 
1999; Fox 2003a).  
Even though the effects doctrine has been applied successfully in many cases, it 
cannot heal the shortcomings of non-coordinated national competition policies as 
outlined in sections 2.1-2.3. On the contrary, the effects doctrine reinforces the in-
bound focus of competition policy and, due to the larger (now also extraterritorial) 
scope of regime jurisdiction, it tends to further increase the problem of multiple 
procedures. Obviously, the effects doctrine also does not help to close down loop-
holes originating from non-existent or ineffective competition regimes. It actually 
further amplifies power asymmetries even among the ‘really working’ regimes. 
While regimes with big internal markets like the U.S. or the EU have sufficient pow-
er to enforce their competition rules against foreign and multinational companies 
(by threatening to tax or block their domestic turnovers), regimes with smaller do-
mestic markets or such from poorer countries (less important domestic markets) 
may face a powerless situation against foreign and multinational companies. The 
attempt of extraterritorial competition law enforcement may in such cases be coun-
tered by threats from the respective companies to stop supplying the markets of 
the country in question.  
The case with the externalities is a bit more complex. If every regime effectively ap-
plied the effects doctrine, then the ignorance of purely outbound anticompetitive 
arrangements and conduct (e.g. export cartels) would not matter anymore. Nega-
tive externalities would in so far be internalized as every jurisdiction would protect 
their domestic markets and, thus, effectively prevent inbound restrictions of com-
petition. However, along with this effect, the scope for jurisdictional conflicts in-
creases since the probability of incompatible decisions on cross-border cases in-
creases. In a perfect enforcement world, conflicting decisions within an effects doc-
trine regime imply that the most restrictive decision prevails (Geradin 2009). Con-
sequently, a complete internalization of negative externalities cannot be expected 
even with perfect effects doctrine enforcement. As the preceding paragraph al-
ready pointed out, however, the effects doctrine can only be effectively enforced by 
sufficiently powerful regimes in reality. Therefore, the theoretical potential for in-
ternalization is rather unlikely to materialize under real-world conditions. Quite 
contrary, power asymmetries between regimes may actually contribute to increase 
negative externalities when the effects doctrine is used as an instrument of strate-
gic competition policy. 
In summary, the unilateral strategy via the effects doctrine is not appropriate to 
improve global welfare. 
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3.2.  The Cooperative Strategy: Bilateral Agreements and Comity Prin-
ciples 
Starting to become widespread in the mid-1970s, bilateral cooperation agreements 
between competition policy regimes became very popular with a heyday in the late 
1990s (overview: Budzinski 2008a: 51). In the absence of more ambitious interna-
tional antitrust institutions, these bilateral agreements – sometimes initiated to 
supplement and complement bilateral trade agreements – usually focused merely 
on cartel prosecution and were predominantly concluded between established 
competition policy regimes of comparatively industrialized countries (see for more 
comprehensive analyses, inter alia, Fullerton & Mazard 2001; Zanettin 2002; Jenny 
2003b). The contents of bilateral cooperation agreements can be categorized in the 
following way: 
- Notification: competition authorities inform each other about ongoing an-
titrust procedures and exchange very general information, but their inves-
tigations, proceedings and decisions remain completely autonomous. 
- Consultation: competition authorities exchange more detailed information, 
particularly regarding technical issues (market definition, case facts, etc.) 
on a completely voluntary and discretionary basis. It remains within the 
discretion of the national agencies whether they pay respect to the inter-
ests of other countries in their independent decision. 
- Mutual Assistance: the cooperating regimes mutually assist each other re-
garding information gathering and/or sanctioning in order to overcome the 
problems of extraterritorial investigation and enforcement. However, mu-
tual assistance only includes cases in which the laws of the cooperating ju-
risdictions produce mutually compatible assessments, investigational pro-
cedures and sanctions. 
- Negative Comity: following this traditional comity principle implies ab-
staining from extraterritorial enforcement of the domestic competition 
rules if there is explicit resistance by the foreign regime (i.e. no hostile ex-
traterritorial enforcement). Thus, with negative comity each competition 
regime agrees to respect serious interests and the sovereignty of the other 
jurisdictions.  
Almost all the bilateral cooperation agreements focused on these less ambitious 
types of cooperation, many included merely mutual notification and consultation. 
For several reasons, these types of bilateral cooperation represent an insufficient 
supplement to non-coordinated extraterritorial competition policy. Although they 
do alleviate the shortcomings of non-coordination, significant limitations remain. 
Firstly, jurisdictional conflicts may be reduced by avoiding misunderstandings. 
However, genuine conflicts of decisions as well as serious conflicts of interests can-
not be solved ‘just’ by mutual notification and consultation. Secondly, the prob-


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lems of multiple procedures are not tackled. Thirdly, the asymmetry of power is not 
resolved. Developing countries were severely underrepresented in existing bilateral 
cooperation agreements and the bargaining power of big industrialized jurisdic-
tions may allow for discriminating agreements or the discriminating use of it (Fox 
2000, 2003a; Jenny 2003a, 2003b). Fourthly, and for the same reasons, loopholes 
are not effectively closed. 
Notwithstanding, the potential of cooperation should not be overlooked. For in-
stance, the prosecution of hardcore cartels seems to represent a comparatively 
beneficial field for bilateral cooperation.7 With a view to leniency programs for 
whistleblowers in hardcore cartels, preliminary modeling hints that, under some 
special circumstances, limited information exchange between competition agencies 
may be optimal to destabilize cartels and deter their formation (Choi & Gerlach 
2010). However, even if there was an overall kaleidoscope of bilateral cooperation 
agreements, involving every antitrust jurisdiction in the world, this network would 
most probably be characterized by significant incoherence. In multijurisdictional 
cases, each jurisdiction would have to handle a multitude of bilateral duties, prob-
ably not consistent with each other since the inbound-focus of competition policy 
remains unchanged. 
- Positive Comity: if a domestic market is negatively affected by an anticom-
petitive arrangement or conduct originating from the partner’s jurisdiction, 
its antitrust authority can request its partner authority to take enforcement 
actions on behalf of the affected country. The cooperating authority ap-
plies its own antitrust laws, however, with a view to combat the outbound 
restrictions on competition, which affect the partner jurisdiction, while the 
affected jurisdiction relinquishes an own procedure and relies on its coop-
eration partner to protect its interests.  
This advanced and far-reaching comity principle is the only one within bilateral 
agreements that actually modifies the inbound-focused policy and adds a responsi-
bility to protect competition abroad and, consequently, also on international mar-
kets as a whole. In doing so, it provides the potential to internalize most negative 
externalities. However, it does so by relying on one competition regime to provide a 
positive externality for the cooperating regime (by targeting to increase its welfare, 
too), which may cause an incentive problem.8 Indeed, the positive comity principle 

7  The prosecution of the international vitamins cartels may represent an outstanding success story 
(First 2001a). However, the absence of industrial policy interests plays an important role. “Where 
no industrial policy at the source is concerned, cartel enforcement at the national level with deep 
cooperation of sister agencies is the success story (in progress) of international antitrust. Where 
industrial policy intervenes, however, the gap is great, as in the case of OPEC, marketing boards 
and commodity cartels” Fox (2003a: 373). 
8  See for an economic analysis of advanced comity principles Budzinski (2008a: 165-166, 199-203).
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in the U.S.-EU agreement did not succeed very well in the so-called Amadeus case.9 
Furthermore, the fundamental problems of bilaterism still apply.  
Altogether, a cacophony of bilateral agreements cannot realistically be expected to 
work under real-world conditions. “It seems over-optimistic to imagine that a 
world-wide framework for competition policy could be built up piecemeal from a 
network of bilateral agreements. (…) [I]t would be virtually impossible to ensure 
that all the agreements were compatible with each other” (Meiklejohn 1999: 
1247). The popularity of bilateral agreements ceased with the implementation of 
the International Competition Network in 2001 (see section 3.4.). 
3.3.  The Multilateral Strategy: International Antitrust Institutions in 
Trade Agreements 
The basic idea to fight international anticompetitive arrangements and conduct on 
an international level has been so straightforward to the political sphere that as far 
back as in 1927, the League of Nations’ World Economic Conference in Geneva put 
the problem of international cartels on its agenda, discussing options for a coordi-
nated international anti-cartel policy effort (Wells 2002: 10-11). This early initiative 
did not have any chance of success, however, since in the 1920s a consensus that 
hardcore cartels are detrimental to welfare and should be combated by antitrust 
policy was just about to form.10 Still, less than two decades later, the next attempt 
to establish multilateral antitrust institutions appeared on the agenda. This time, it 
was driven by the desire to create a coherent and comprehensive post-war world 
economic order, consisting of international institutions and organizations for the 
governance of (i) the monetary system and international currency relations (Inter-
national Monetary Fund; The World Bank Group), (ii) public cross-border re-
strictions to competition, i.e. trade barriers (Havana Charter and International Trade 
Organization; in advance established in 1947 as the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, GATT), and (iii) private cross-border restraints of competition (the 1948 
Havana Charter; International Trade Organization). While the first two institutions 

9  In 1997 the U.S. Department of Justice formally requested the European Commission to investi-
gate allegedly anticompetitive practices by European airlines, discriminating U.S. enterprises. 
More detailed, the EU computer reservation system Amadeus was said to be acting in an exclu-
sionary way, thus deterring the concurrent U.S. system SABRE. However, the procedure seemed 
to proceed rather sluggish and hampered by deviating investigation techniques and evidentiary 
standards between the U.S. and the EU. The case was eventually settled in 2000 by private 
agreements between the airlines and their reservation system companies. See also Zanettin 
(2002: 188-189). 
10  In many European countries of the late 19th and early 20th century, cartels (including even hori-
zontal price-fixing arrangements) were viewed as (i) a legitimate part of the freedom of business 
and (ii) an effective instrument against the permanent thread of deflation (because of their price-
‘stabilizing’ effects), which was inherent to the contemporary gold standard currency system as 
soon as domestic economic growth met with deficits in the balance of trade. On the origins and 
development of competition law and policy in Europe see Gerber (1998).

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were set into force while the window of opportunity due to the global catastrophe 
of World War II was open, the international antitrust institution-part missed out 
and was subsequently abandoned in 1953 due to a lack of ratification by leading 
members states (Wells 2002: 116-125). 
However, the idea of international antitrust institutions being a complement to 
trade liberalization rules remained virulent. The benefits of trade liberalization can 
only be reaped in a sustainable way if the competition-intensifying effects of open-
ing up national markets for international competition (Budzinski 2008a: 27-32) are 
not counteracted by the emergence of cross-border anticompetitive arrangements 
and conduct, re-establishing the pre-liberalization non-competitive equilibrium. 
Therefore, effective means against international cartels and against international 
market dominance need to accompany trade liberalization. This is in line with theo-
retical economic thinking (inter alia, Ross 1988; Feinberg 1991; Jacquemin 1995; 
Cadot et al. 2000; Hamilton & Stiegert 2000; Gaudet & Kanouni 2004; Mehra 2011; 
rather contrasting: Hauser & Schoene 1994). 
Consequently, competition provisions somewhat survived on the agenda of the 
World Trading System and in some instances found their way into regional trade 
agreements, albeit predominantly in rather rudimental shape (Alvarez et al. 2005; 
Cernat 2005; Evenett 2005). After the establishment of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (1995, comprising GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in Services GATS 
and the agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, TRIPS), interna-
tional competition resurfaced on the agenda, leading to the adoption of WTO anti-
trust institutions in the Doha Declaration (2001). However, in the aftermath of the 
Cancún conflicts, centering predominantly on agricultural markets issues, the anti-
trust provisions were provisionally abandoned in 2004 – and since then a reappear-
ance does not look likely. 
While the recurring attempts to establish multilateral competition rules can easily 
be motivated both by the shortcomings and limits of unilateral and bilateral ap-
proaches (see sections 4.1. and 4.2.) as well as by the complementary nature of 
trade liberalization and protection of competition on international markets, the 
likewise recurring failures to actually establish international antitrust institutions 
have motivated additional economic research. From a game-theoretic perspective, 
negotiations on international antitrust institutions among sovereign nations re-
semble the characteristics of a prisoners’ dilemma game. Even if adopting interna-
tional antitrust institutions would represent the world welfare optimum, the play-
ers may end up in an inferior equilibrium because it is individually rational to 
choose strategic competition policies (beggar-my-neighbor policies) in the absence 
of an effective institution. Due to the incentive structure, such an institution is no-
toriously difficult to establish outside specific ‘windows of opportunity’ – at least in 
rather simplistic game-theoretical models (à la Budzinski 2003). More advanced 
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models (building upon so-called supergames) allow for much more differentiated 
analyses that also display self-enforcing cooperation patterns (Cabral 2003, 2005). 
However, also dynamic prisoners’ dilemma games show that cooperation is possi-
ble but not necessary and may take long to be successfully established. 
3.4.   The Network Strategy: The ICN after 10 Years 
During the years where the hitherto last attempt to establish WTO competition 
rules failed, a new avenue towards international antitrust institutions surfaced. On 
its route a multilateral perspective was combined with a focus on voluntary coop-
eration among competition agencies and within one decade the resulting network 
developed to become the most important international antitrust player in the 
world.  
There have been attempts to establish voluntary multilateral cooperation before. In 
1967, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) creat-
ed a forum for their members in order to debate international competition issues 
and issue consensus-based recommendations on competition policy – with the lat-
ter goal being abandoned in the 1990s (Zanettin 2002: 53-57). Furthermore, in 
1980, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) adopt-
ed a so-called Restrictive Business Practices Code with the particular aim of protect-
ing developing countries against inbound anticompetitive arrangements and con-
duct by powerful multinational enterprises. It attempted to ban, inter alia, price-
fixing arrangements and other hardcore cartels as well as boycotts. However, the 
comparatively ambitious code lacked enforceability (First 2003). At the end of the 
day, both initiatives failed to produce considerable effects regarding a satisfying 
level of protection of international competition (Wells 2002; First 2003). 
Based on the concept of a Global Competition Initiative developed by the Interna-
tional Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the U.S. Department of Justice 
(ICPAC 2000), 15 national competition agencies (including the European Commis-
sion) established the International Competition Network (ICN) in October 2001 
(Finckenstein 2003; Janow & Rill 2011). Until today, membership of the ICN has 
risen to 121 competition agencies from more than 100 jurisdictions all around the 
world.11 Being a network of competition agencies and calling itself a virtual organi-
zation, the ICN neither is based on an international contract, nor has its own ad-
ministrative staff or budget. The ICN is led by a steering group consisting of leading 
officials from member agencies with the board positions rotating among the mem-

11  This includes several regional-but-international competition agencies like the European Commis-
sion or the CARICOM Competition Commission. The number of member agencies is higher than 
the number of participating countries because some jurisdictions have more than one competi-
tion agency. Figures according to 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-directory.aspx (accessed 
12th of June, 2012). Motta (2012: 1) even mentions 123 member agencies. 

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bers.12 Annual conferences of all member agencies with participation of different 
stakeholder groups represent the major ‘decision body’. The actual work is done in 
so-called working groups (WGs), which typically start out by reviewing and com-
paratively evaluating the current practices of the member agencies. They constitute 
themselves project-oriented and expire if the respective agenda has been finished. 
The general goal of the WGs is to develop best practice recommendations that are 
subsequently consensually adopted by the annual conference. In addition to the 
substantive WGs, administrative working groups address problems of internal gov-
ernance. Currently, the ICN consists of five substantive and two administrative 
WGs, which are overviewed in figures 1-6. The voluntariness of cooperation and the 
non-binding character of all best practice recommendations represent a fundamen-
tal principle and an important characteristic of the ICN. Still, the eventual goal of 
the ICN is about improving international competition governance. By promoting 
multilateral cooperation among competition agencies and by creating a common 
competition culture, convergence of national and regional competition policies, 
starting with procedural issues but aiming at substantive issues as well, is on the 
long-run agenda (ICN 2011; Mitchell 2011: 5).13 
During its first decade, the ICN has produced an impressive output of more than 
10,000 pages of ‘virtual’ paper. While the dozens of comparative analyses of 
worldwide existing practices and institutions regarding specific competition policy 
fields represent a valuable stock of knowledge, inter alia, also for competition eco-
nomics, law and policy researchers, the main institutional contribution of the ICN is 
represented by the consensually adopted best practice recommendations as well as 
by enforcement manuals on various topics (ICN 2011). They include, for instance, 
the Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures, the 
Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual or the Market Studies Good Practices Handbook 
(see also fig. 1-5). 
The question whether purely voluntary cooperation, resting on the publication of 
consensual best practice recommendations, can actually be successful triggered 
theoretical and empirical economic research. Budzinski (2004a, 2004b) analyzed 
the economics of combing consensual best practice recommendations with peer 
pressure. Even though it remains completely voluntary whether individual competi-
tion policy regimes bring their practices and institutions in line with the published 
ICN best practice recommendations or not, the consensual character of the recom-
mendations and their public availability creates peer pressure. Agencies that have 
agreed that a certain practice is the best one will face a loss of reputation if they 

12  Currently (June 2012), Eduardo Pérez-Motta (Mexican Federal Competition Commission) repre-
sents the chair of the ICN. From the establishment of the ICN on, the Canadian Competition Bu-
reau has taken a leading responsibility for the administration. 
13  See for recent academic analyses of the ICN, inter alia, Fox (2009), Coppola (2011), Hollman & 
Kovacic (2011), Lugard (2011) and Sokol (2011).
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stick to an inferior practice – even according to their own evaluation expressed in 
the consensually adopted ICN recommendation. Thus, the combination of pub-
lished best practice recommendations and peer pressure sets strong incentives to 
actually comply with the ICN recommendations on the regime level. Furthermore, it 
is in line with behavioral economic thinking that a systematic and cooperative dis-
cussion of competition policy matters among the competition agencies has the po-
tential to harmonize views on competition and antitrust issues, thus, promoting 
the targeted common competition culture (Budzinski 2004a). Once this ‘cognitive’ 
harmonization process has taken off, it can develop strong force. However, particu-
larly in the early period considerable obstacles may impede this process altogether. 
Nonetheless, peer pressure through publication and transparency of superior anti-
trust practices, which have been consensually acknowledged as superior, should 
promote a widespread adoption of the ICN best practice recommendations by the 
member authorities. This economic theory reasoning is supported by early empirical 
analyses, suggesting that ICN best practice recommendations actually influence 
competition regime reforms and implementation processes in member jurisdictions 
(Rowley & Campbell 2005; Evenett & Hijzen 2006).  
4. Challenges and Unsolved Problems: The Way Forward 
4.1.  The Success Story ICN 
Without any doubt, the ICN has managed many impressive achievements in its first 
decade – and more so than many experts were expecting. First of all, the combina-
tion of consensual best practice recommendations and peer pressure through the 
publication of the recommendations has been effective in the sense that many 
countries cited the ICN recommendations as motivation and guideline for domestic 
reforms of antitrust institutions. Moreover, both scientific analysis (Rowley & 
Campbell 2005; Evenett & Hijzen 2006) and internal assessment (ICN 2011) confirm 
that many member jurisdictions indeed reformed their competition rules to be 
more in line with the ICN recommendations. Thus, there is a harmonization effect 
on national competition policy regimes through the ICN membership that has po-
tentials to reduce jurisdictional conflicts over antitrust issues as well as to decrease 
the volume and severity of negative externalities, albeit not to zero. 
Secondly, the ICN has been very successful in promoting the implementation of 
competition regimes in developing and transitory countries. The impressive rise in 
membership is partly due to the establishment of new competition policy regimes 
in previously antitrust-free jurisdictions and the ICN played a considerable role in 
this process. Furthermore, the ICN comprehensively engaged in capacity building 
for agencies in newly-established and also in previously defunct or ineffective com-
petition policy regimes. This has contributed to reduce loopholes in the worldwide 


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protection of competition, which were due to a lack of effective competition policy 
regimes in particular in many developing and transitory countries (Sokol 2009). And 
the newly-established regimes have to a large extent particularly used the ICN best 
practice recommendations as a role-model for their antitrust institutions. 
Thirdly, the ICN has published compilations of current practices in member jurisdic-
tions (inter alia, merger review including substantive assessment and prohibition 
standards, anti-cartel enforcement techniques, unilateral conduct, competition ad-
vocacy, etc.). In many cases, for instance in the case of the unilateral conduct com-
pilation, the main function of the compilations is to highlight the differences 
among member jurisdictions. While not directly promoting harmonization, the re-
sulting transparency serves to improve the mutual understanding of differing and 
potentially incompatible case decisions and, thus, may contribute to reducing con-
flicts over such decisions (‘informed divergence’; Mitchell 2011: 6). 
Fourthly, the ICN has produced handbooks, manuals and toolkits on many down-
to-earth competition policy practices. They represent an important practical help 
for competition agency officials regarding the everyday handling of cases. Together 
with the curriculum project (see figure 1), they serve as materials for the training of 
agency staff and proved particularly useful to young agencies that lack long-
standing experiences how to deal with antitrust cases. 
Fifthly, it is certainly a success story that the ICN managed to actually issue an im-
pressive number of consensually adopted best practice recommendations (see fig-
ures 1-5). This achievement alone exceeds the output of former multilateral coop-
eration attempts. It proved to be considerably supportive for the success of coop-
eration that competition agencies have been driving the process and negotiated 
the agreements – instead of governments and government officials. Even across 
jurisdictions, the interests of competition agencies are significantly more homoge-
nous and consensus-suited than the interests of governments. 
Eventually, a rather informal effect is often cited by participants as representing the 
main benefit from the ICN: mutual experience-sharing and getting-to-know each 
other (ICN 2011; Mitchell 2011: 3). The strong working relationship developed 
through the face-to-face contact on ICN seminars, workshops and conferences fa-
cilitates informal cooperation also outside the direct ICN scope.  
4.2.  Limits of the ICN Approach? 
Notwithstanding the achievements, the fifth aspect, however, already hints at some 
inherent limits of the ICN approach to international antitrust institutions from an 
economic perspective. A closer look on the best practice recommendations reveals 
that there are barely any recommendations on substantive issues. The recommen-
dations that were possible in consensus among all the members are predominantly 
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referring to procedural issues like transparency of notification requirements, fees, 
timetables, etc. One must not underestimate that this type of best practice recom-
mendations represents an important progress in international antitrust both for 
interacting agencies and norm addressees (the companies). However, along with 
the lack of substantial convergence (substantive rules and standards, delineation 
between pro- and anticompetitive effects, theories of harm, assessment practices 
and policies, etc.), the potential of the ICN to internalize negative externalities from 
diverging and incompatible case decisions appear to be rather limited and this lim-
ited scope has effectively been reaped in the first decade. Without consensus on 
more ambitious best practice recommendations, diminishing returns on further 
‘low controversial’ recommendations must be expected for the second decade. 
With respect to the problem of negative externalities, the economic analysis identi-
fies the inbound focus of competition policy, i.e. the absence of an international 
welfare goal for national competition policy regimes, as a sufficient condition to 
create negative cross-border externalities (see section 2.1). This problem is not ad-
dressed by the ICN so far. Furthermore, it appears to be rather unlikely that an in-
stitutional arrangement like the ICN can be capable of introducing a world welfare 
goal for national competition policy regimes. Since it is the very nature of the ICN 
to rely on consensus and voluntary participation and implementation, it cannot 
provide any binding, contractual agreement which in case of defection may be en-
forced in member jurisdictions. Thus, the only way would be to issue a best practice 
recommendation on antitrust goals (world welfare) and hope for (i) a consensual 
adoption on an annual conference and (ii) voluntary compliance to the recommen-
dation by the member jurisdictions. Since this typically refers to ‘hard’ law, the 
members of the ICN – competition agencies – would not be able to implement that 
recommendation without support from the legislative chambers (e.g. parliaments) 
and executive institutions (e.g. government) in their jurisdictions. This might well 
represent a limit to the ‘soft’ law approach of the ICN. 
Another problem of international competition governance – the deficiencies of 
multiple procedures (see section 2.2) – has been alleviated by the ICN only to a neg-
ligible extent. Due to the imperfect convergence of procedures through the adopt-
ed best practice recommendations, the costs of multijurisdictional antitrust case 
handling have been decreased marginally. However, since there has been no reduc-
tion of the number of antitrust procedures in conjunction with, for instance, a mul-
tijurisdictional merger, the vast majority of transaction and administration cost 
burdens remain unchanged. In the end, there is still nothing remotely close to a 
one-stop shop. Ironically, the impressive increase in active competition policy re-
gimes around the world has actually increased the number of jurisdiction that de-
clares themselves competent for international and particularly intercontinental 
competition cases. This in turn increases the deficiencies of multiple procedures and 


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most probably more than compensates for the cost improvement due to soft and 
imperfect procedural harmonization. With the ICN as it is now, it is difficult to see 
how the second decade can bring significant improvements. The ICN does not en-
tail direct case-related cooperation but exactly this would be necessary if consider-
able efficiency gains from international antitrust institutions are to be realized. 
Even though the ICN indirectly facilitates case-related cooperation because the 
member agencies and their staff know each other and know whom to call for in-
formal exchange and cooperation over a given case (ICN 2011; Mitchell 2011), this 
grassroots effect – which without any doubt is highly important and helpful for 
everyday work – remains rather limited in the absence of an institutionalized case-
related cooperation. 
The loopholes in the worldwide landscape of competition regimes (see section 2.3) 
have been substantially reduced by the ICN’s activities. Next to the impressive in-
crease in newly-established competition regimes, the ICN has also been very active 
in arming previously rather ineffective competition regimes. However, there has 
been virtually no change in a particularly problematic area, which is the power 
asymmetry when it comes to enforcing domestic competition rules against multina-
tional companies by means of the effects doctrine (see section 3.1). If domestic 
markets are not sufficiently important for the business of the multinational, then 
the multinational remains in a position to avoid compliance by boycotting the re-
spective country. The threat of this alone influences the decisions of smaller and 
less powerful regimes. Again, the regime of the uncoordinated effects doctrine can 
only be overcome by (i) replacing inbound competition policy goals with interna-
tional welfare standards and (ii) a case-related cooperation approach. As has been 
argued in the preceding paragraphs, both seem to be difficult to achieve with an 
ICN of the current nature and structure. 
The fourth criterion to assess international antitrust institutions from an economic 
perspective (as derived in section 2) is the diversity of regimes reflecting the diversi-
ty and the provisional nature of economic thinking on competition. It refers to the 
dynamic and evolutionary efficiency of international antitrust institutions. The ICN 
highlights this by systematically reviewing the different practices in the member 
jurisdictions and its compilations of the differences create transparency that serves 
to speed up mutual learning processes. Actually, the ICN best practice recommen-
dations represent the result of such a learning process. However, this is exactly 
where problems kick in: with a best practice result that leads to all member jurisdic-
tion harmonizing their regimes according to this result the dynamic learning pro-
cess comes to an end. This implies no more future learning due to a lack of experi-
ments with new insights and new methods, theories, etc. Thus, the provisional 
economic knowledge of the time of the best practice recommendation becomes a 
persistent standard and scientific progress of the future will find it much more dif-
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ficult to enter the stage.14 If learning from diversity is useful for finding today’s best 
practices, then learning from diversity will also be useful to detect future’s best 
practices. Consequently, three hazards are incorporated to the ICN’s harmonization 
approach. Firstly, the identification of best practices to some extent relies on and 
promotes academically controversial practices (like the case-by-case effects ap-
proach in merger control). Secondly, the injection of new scientific knowledge is 
deterred. Both hazards together may lead to a deficient harmonization. Thirdly, the 
ICN best practice approach implicitly assumes that there actually are one-size-fits-all 
benchmarks. However, best practices for old-industrialized countries’ competition 
regimes may differ from such for newly-industrialized or developing or transitory 
countries’ ones. Of course, the reasoning in this paragraph must be qualified to the 
extent that it becomes only relevant when the ICN is unexpectedly successful in 
achieving also substantive harmonization. 
In summary, the first decade of the ICN must be hailed for bringing the most signif-
icant progress to global competition governance of all times so far. However, from 
the viewpoint of global economic welfare, there are still a lot of challenges and un-
solved problems, covering all the four criteria (international externalities, deficien-
cies from multiple procedures, loopholes, and regime diversity) that can be formu-
lated from an economic perspective. Moreover, and even more seriously, it appears 
to be rather doubtful whether in its current form (purely voluntary cooperation, 
reliance on consensus and peer pressure), the ICN is well-suited and well-equipped 
to address the remaining issues. Ironically, the (unexpected) success of the ICN’s 
first decade may imply bad news for its second decade since the potentials have 
already been exploited so that from now on diminishing returns of the network 
strategy must be expected. 15 
4.3.  A Way Forward? Towards a Multilevel Lead Jurisdiction Model 
So, how can international antitrust institutions be designed to embrace all four cri-
teria with their conflicting incentives toward more centralization (internalizing ex-

14  It should be emphasized here that the process of scientific knowledge accumulation and pro-
gress is a permanent one and all social science knowledge must be provisional by the nature of 
the (creative, innovative and intentional) object of research (Budzinski 2008b: 313-317). 
15  When the ICN envisions enforcement cooperation to be an important topic for its second decade, 
for instance, it refers to “facilitating and promoting informal cooperation and exchange of 
nonconfidential materials, which may help to foster better inter-agency relations and indirectly 
promote future formal cooperation; developing tools to facilitate identification of agencies re-
viewing or investigating matters and contacts in those agencies; promoting the exchange of ex-
perience and identifying and disseminating practical tips relevant to cooperation through the ICN 
blog17 and webinar programs; developing advocacy materials on the value of cooperation; and 
creating ICN guidance, such as investigational checklists and/or model cooperation agreements 
or confidentiality provisions, for use by ICN members” (Mitchell 2011: 6). This ICN-typical list – 
while without doubt representing valuable topics – demonstrates the type of consensual output 
that the ICN is capable of and thus entails prospects and limits at the same time. Replacing na-
tional welfare goals by international welfare goals or introducing one-stop shops for multina-
tional cases go far beyond the ambition level expressed here.

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ternalities and reducing multiple procedures; stationary efficiency) o the one hand 
and preservation of regime diversity (dynamic and evolutionary efficiency through 
decentralization) on the other hand? The economic literature offers two interesting 
concepts to approach this balancing act. The first concept is the idea of a lead ju-
risdiction model (Campbell & Trebilcock 1993, 1997; Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004). 
It extends the positive comity concept (see section 3.2) by allocating competence 
and responsibility for multijurisdictional competition cases to one of the affected 
regimes that subsequently handles and decides the case with a view to avoiding 
anticompetitive effects in the overall geographic market (i.e. in all affected jurisdic-
tions) and by relying on the assistance of the other involved regimes.16 The second 
concept is the idea of multilevel governance (Kerber 2003) in which regimes on 
different vertical levels (regional, national, supranational) are interconnected with 
each other. In such a complex multilevel system of institutions, the design of com-
petence allocation rules, managing the interfaces of the participating regimes, be-
comes particularly important. Economic analysis reveals that different competence 
allocation rules (such as the effects doctrine, interjurisdictional commerce clauses, 
turnover thresholds, nondiscrimination, principle of origin doctrine, relevant mar-
kets rule or x-pus rule) are more or less appropriate when it comes to specified hor-
izontal or vertical regime interfaces (Budzinski 2008a: 151-217).  
With a view to the four economic problems of international antitrust (as derived in 
section 2), it represents an interesting step to combine these two concepts towards 
a multilevel lead jurisdiction model (Budzinski 2009, 2011). The advantage of add-
ing the vertical multilevel dimension to the lead jurisdiction concept lies in the op-
tion to introduce a referee authority, monitoring and supervising the impartiality of 
the assigned lead jurisdictions and providing conflict resolution if necessary. Thus, 
the antitrust institutions on the global level are not about materially deciding cases. 
Instead, they allocate lead jurisdiction according to agreed-upon criteria on a case 
basis17, monitor and supervise the lead jurisdiction in respect of its impartial treat-
ment of anticompetitive effects in the overall relevant international market (irre-
spective where – in which jurisdiction – the effects display) and settle conflicts in 
case of affected jurisdictions allege that their domestic effects were disregarded by 

16  Two sub-concepts can be distinguished: in the voluntary lead jurisdiction model (Campbell & 
Trebilcock 1993, 1997), the lead jurisdiction just proposes a decision and the each of the affected 
regimes decides on its own whether to adopt this paragon decision or not, whereas in the man-
datory lead jurisdiction model (Trebilcock & Iacobucci 2004; Budzinski 2008a: 166-168, 203-206) 
the decision of the lead jurisdiction binds the other affected jurisdictions. Note an important dif-
ference between the ICN-style network approach and the lead jurisdiction concept: while the ICN 
works on the level of guidelines and principles, the lead jurisdiction model works on the case lev-
el, assigning lead jurisdiction to one of the involved regimes on a case-by-case nature (according 
to pre-defined allocation criteria). 
17  This only refers to multijurisdictional cases; cases that display effects merely within one of the 
existing competition policy regimes are solely subject to this regime’s jurisdiction. For possible 
delineation criteria as well as for possible criteria for selecting lead jurisdictions see Budzinski 
(2009: 377-381, 2011: 81-87), also for more details on the following discussion.
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the lead jurisdiction. Consequently, ‘only’ procedural competences are assigned to 
the global level and all material and substantive decision competences remain on 
the level of the existing national and regional-supranational regimes.  
From an economic perspective, the charm of this concept is that it (i) replaces the 
inbound focus of existing competition policy regimes by a focus embracing all ef-
fects in the relevant geographic (international) market, (ii) provides a one-stop shop 
for the norm addressees (thus avoiding deficient transaction and administration 
costs of multiple procedures), (iii) closes many loopholes due to the lead jurisdic-
tion being powerful and also providing protection of competition abroad, and (iv) 
maintains diversity of competition regimes because each assigned lead jurisdiction 
handles and decides the case according to this regime’s antitrust rules and proce-
dures, just with the explicit inclusion of cross-border effects. On the downside, it 
requires an international agreement on procedural rules (in particular criteria for 
allocating case-specific lead jurisdiction as well as for monitoring and conflict reso-
lution mechanisms) and willingness to accept (i) procedural decisions by the inter-
national level and (ii) material decisions by the lead jurisdiction as long as all effects 
are treated impartially irrespective of their jurisdictional location. This certainly rep-
resents a higher hurdle for consensus than the ICN-style network cooperation, but 
certainly a lower hurdle than consensus on binding global competition rules within 
the WTO framework. And from an economic perspective, such a multilevel lead ju-
risdiction model appears to be welfare-superior to these alternatives. However, the 
concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model is far from being comprehensively 
researched. Furthermore, an interesting exploration would be whether such a mod-
el could develop from the contemporary ICN when it seriously strives to solve the 
economic problems of international antitrust in its second or third decade. 
5. Conclusion 
The global governance of competition represents an important economic problem. 
Economic theory clearly shows that non-coordinated competition policies of re-
gimes that are territorially smaller than the international markets on which business 
companies compete violate cross-border allocative efficiency and are deficient with 
respect to global welfare. At the same time, some diversity of antitrust institutions 
and policies promotes dynamic and evolutionary efficiency so that globally binding, 
worldwide homogenous competition rules do not represent a first-best solution – 
even when neglecting obvious agreement and implementation difficulties.  
Since 2001, the world of international antitrust institutions has been significantly 
influenced by the then-established International Competition Network. This multi-
lateral forum for voluntary cooperation among competition agencies has been a 
success story in its first decade – by far exceeding most experts’ expectation. The 

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ICN has considerably contributed to alleviate the negative economic effects from 
the previous, virtually non-coordinated world of international antitrust. However 
and notwithstanding, from an economic welfare point of view, considerable chal-
lenges and problems remain on the agenda. 
Whether the ICN in its current structure and nature has the potential to solve the 
remaining problems represents a decisive question for the future of international 
antitrust institutions. Despite the success story of its first decade, however, eco-
nomic analysis justifies skepticism whether the contemporary ICN is up to the re-
maining challenges. In particular, a change from inbound-, national-welfare-
focused competition policies to such pursuing supranational and suprajurisdictional 
welfare goals as well as cooperation on concrete, specified cases are necessary from 
an economic perspective. However, both topics are hardly compatible with the con-
temporary governance principles of the ICN. A way forward can be expected from 
the economic concept of a multilevel lead jurisdiction model that possesses the po-
tential to balance allocative and dynamic efficiency. It remains an open question, 
though, whether such a model could evolve out of the ICN during the next dec-
ade(s). 
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